Land & Water Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 2

Article 11

1982

The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the
Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders
Duane M. Kline, III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Kline, III, Duane M. (1982) "The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of
Juvenile Offenders," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 17 : Iss. 2 , pp. 643 - 680.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Kline, III: The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Impri

THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER STATUTE:
THREE CHALLENGES TO THE IMPRISONMENT
OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
At the regular meeting in May, 1979, the Wyoming
Board of Charities and Reform voted to send a 17-year-old
juvenile offender to the State Penitentiary.1 The Board
which is made up of the top executive officers of the State'
does not regularly oversee the administration of inmates'
sentences.3 Parole is administered by the Board of Parole4
and probation is administered by the sentencing court.' The
decision to send Larry B. to prison was made in a few minutes without a hearing, without the presentation of evidence,
without notice or representation for the juvenile who was
at that time an inmate at the Wyoming Industrial Institute.
The Board of Charities and Reform listened to the recommendation from the Superintendent of the Industrial InstiCopyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1.

Because Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-239 (1978) makes it unlawful to publish the
name of a minor involved in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act,
the case which is described in the opening section cannot be cited. Larry B.
is, of course, a fictional name. The story as it is related is taken from
court records, records of the Board of Charities and Reform and from
discussions with several of the people involved in the case. It is accurate
according to the records and is not a single isolated incident but rather
represents a common procedure in several states. The issues discussed in
this comment were raised before the Board of Charities and Reform by
way of memorandum which discussed the "Larry B. case." See Wyoming
State Tribune, July 6, 1981, at 1.
The sections describing the various juvenile court practices are taken
from court documents, records of the Board of Charities and Reform and
from conversations with Wyoming attorneys and judges. The various district court judges who also sit as judges of the juvenile courts, Wyo. STAT.
§ 14-6-202 (1978), use somewhat different approaches to the questions of
the pretrial hearing to determine adult or juvenile jurisdiction and
sentencing. It is beyond the scope of this comment to set out these differences and their effect. It is worth noting, however, that the Wyoming
Juvenile Court Act of 1971 was passed in response to the major Supreme
Court decisions discussed in this comment. It was a stopgap measure that
filled the big holes in Wyoming's juvenile procedure, but it does not provide a complete logical system for handling juvenile offenders. It is not
surprising then that the courts have filled the remaining gaps in a variety
of ways. As a result, the individual juveniles face widely varying procedures, some of which adequately protect their rights and interests and
some of which do not.
For an illuminating review and critique of the juvenile justice system
in Wyoming, see OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE WYOMING JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, AN EVALUATION (1981) [hereinafter cited as WYOMING JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, AN EVALUATION]. The report describes the

2.
3.
4.
5.

maze of courts, officials and agencies which have broad and frequently
overlapping authority over juvenile matters, and concludes that "Wyoming
has never had a statewide juvenile system." Id. at 11.
WYO. STAT. § 9-3-701 (1977).
The Board of Charities and Reform is established in WYo. CONST. art, 7,
§ 18, and the powers are delineated in WYo. STAT. § 9-3-706 (Supp. 1980)
and Wyo. STAT. § 9-3-707 (1977).
WYO. STAT. §§ 7-13-402 to -403 (1977).
Id. §§ 7-13-301, -304.
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tute that Larry B. should be housed at the Penitentiary,
then voted to approve the transfer.0 The vote drew brief
criticism from one member, but the whole business was
quickly buried among budget and administrative concerns.
Larry B. had been confined to the Industrial Institute
after being adjudged a "delinquent child"' in an informal
hearing before a juvenile court judge. Once the decision had
been made to try Larry as a juvenile,8 the judge who placed
6. The superintendent's recommendation described Larry as a "management
problem" and "a threat to the order in the institution." The incident which
was the immediate cause of the transfer request was Larry's second escape
attempt which resulted in some physical damage to the institution (no
dollar amount was stated), and a tussle with a case worker, who was
apparently uninjured.
7. Any minor who is found by the juvenile court to have committed any act
in violation of the laws of the State of Wyoming or its political subdivisions is a "delinquent child" under the Juvenile Court Act of 1971. WYo.
STAT. § 14-6-201 (iii), (ix), (x) (1978).
8. As required by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States,
283 U.S. 541 (1966), the Wyoming Juvenile Court Act provides for a pretrial hearing to determine whether the minor offender should be tried as a
juvenile in juvenile court or as an adult in district court. WYo. STAT.
§ 14-6-237 (1978). If the judge determines that juvenile proceedings are
inappropriate for this minor, and that there is a high likelihood that the
juvenile committed the crime and the juvenile is not subject to being placed
in a mental institution, then the juvenile will be tried as an adult and receive a full trial of the charges and be subject to the full legal penalty.
The criteria used to determine what kind of proceedings are appropriate
for any particular juvenile are not stated in the Wyoming Juvenile Court
Act. In its decision in Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court set out a list of eight criteria for use in juvenile proceedings in the
District of Columbia. 383 U.S. at 566-67. This list has become the generally
accepted standard in Wyoming proceedings, although the use of the eightpoint standard has never been affirmatively mandated by the United States
Supreme Court:
The determinative factors which will be considered by the judge
in deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States
Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense
in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are
adults who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the Juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
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him in the Industrial Institute did not have authority to
commit Larry to the Penitentiary.0 Yet, the Board of Charities and Reform, relying on a confusing statute originally
passed in 1909,10 regularly transfers inmates from the Industrial Institute to the prison without any hearing. 1 In
Larry's case, within six months of his placement in the
Industrial Institute, he was imprisoned in the same facility,
on the same floor, as Wyoming's convicted felons without
having an opportunity to fully contest his imprisonment.
Furthermore, he would be confined at the prison until the
same Board of Charities and Reform decided to transfer
him back to the Industrial Institute or to release him.' 2
Since there is no maximum term set by the original judge18
or by the Board," Larry may be imprisoned in the Peniten-

9.
10.
11.

12.

13.

14.

8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found
to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
383 U.S. at 566-67.
WYO. STAT. § 14-6-229 (1978) sets out the range of powers the juvenile
court has over the delinquent child; confinement in prison is not included.
Id. § 9-6-311 (1977) ; originally 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 10.
As will be seen later, there are four separate categories of minors who are
affected by the Prison Transfer Statute, Wyo. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977). In
the summer of 1981 there were at least four juveniles confined at the State
Penitentiary who were transferred by the Board of Charities and reform
pursuant to the statute. Three of them were transferred under conditions
somewhat different than Larry's but all of them were transferred without
benefit of a due process hearing. See Wyoming State Tribune, July 6, 1981,
at 1.
Attorneys General Opinion No. 1 (Jan. 3, 1974), in OFFICIAL OPINIONS,
1973-1976, at 81; id. No. 65 (June 7, 1956), in OFFICIAL OPINIONS, 19531956, at 547. Much of the legal analysis in these opinions do repreand is contrary to the analysis in this comment; but the opinions do represent the position of the Board of Charities and Reform in handling these
types of cases. Like the original transfer decision, there are no procedures
established by the Board for periodic review. This review is made by request of an interested party.
WYo. STAT. § 14-6-229(c) (iii) (1978). Juvenile commitments are theoretically rehabilitative in nature and not punitive. Because of this, most commitments are for whatever period it takes to rehabilitate the inmate or, as
the statute puts it, "indefinitely." Practically, the two major factors in
determining the length the juvenile is held seem to be: (1) the availability
of space at the institution; and (2) the inmate's willingness to cooperate
with the administration of the Institute.
WYO. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977) makes no provision for setting a sentence
once the juvenile is transferred to the Penitentiary. WYo. STAT. § 14-6-231
(a) (1978) gives the Board of Charities and Reform the power to release
any juvenile committed to the Industrial Institute. Attorney General Opinion No. 1 (Jan. 3, 1974), supra note 12, states that this statute gives the
Board the corresponding power to terminate the sentence of any juvenile
transferred from the Industrial Institute to the Penitentiary. While this
power may be implied by a court faced with interpreting the statute, the
power is not found in the language of WYo. STAT. § 14-6-231 (a) (1978).
Sentencing is a judicial power and may not be delegated to an executive
board. Wyo. R. CraM. P. 33; WYO.CONST. art. 5, § 1; Uram v. Roach, 47
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tiary until he reaches the age of 21."5 If Larry's original
offense was a misdemeanor, he could serve four years in
prison for a crime which if committed by an adult carries
a maximum sentence of 90 days in a county jail." Finally,
Larry served time in prison without the benefit of a trial
or of a judicial determination of the proper sentence.
This article will examine the many aspects of the
Institutional Transfer Statute 7 and how it relates to the
Juvenile Court Act of 1971.8 Though the statute is substantially the same as when it was first adopted in 1913,
it has come to be used in ways its drafters could not have
foreseen. After examining its present uses, the article will

15.
16.
17.

18.

Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793 (1934). While it has been held that the length of a
prison term under an indeterminant sentencing statute is not required to
be set by the sentencing court, see In re Sandel, 64 Cal.2d 412, 412 P.2d
806, 50 Cal. Rptr. 462, (1966), this differs substantially from the questions
of statutory authorization raised by Wyo. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 14-6-231 (c) (1978).
Id. §§ 6-1-102,-107 (1977).
In this comment the term Institutional Transfer Statute refers to WYo.
STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977) which allows the Board of Charities and Reform to
transfer inmates at the Industrial Institute to the Penitentiary. This statute also provides authority for transfer and return from the Industrial
Institute to the State Hospital.
Two related statutes provide for discretionary transfer from the
Penitentiary to the Industrial Institute by the Board of Parole of first
offenders under the age of 21, Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-102 (1977), and for
optional sentencing of first offenders under the age of 21 to the Industrial
Institute rather than the Penitentiary when a juvenile or young adult has
been convicted of a crime in district court. Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-101 (1977).
These related statutes are part of the overall scheme of inter-institutional transfer. This comment will treat these additional statutes only to
the extent it is necessary in order to demonstrate the abuse of the Institutional Transfer Statute. This overall scheme of transfer among institutions
arose early in the century and is not integrated into the Juvenile Court
Act. There are numerous inconsistencies in the operation of these statutes.
The three statutes are administered by three different agencies: the Board
of Charities and Reform administers Wyo. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977) ; the
Board of Parole administers Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-102 (1977); and the district courts administer Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-101 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977) grants a power without any defined guidelines; WYo. STAT. § 7-13-102 (1977) is apparently to be applied within
the framework of the parole process; and Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-101 (1977)
is an extension of the general sentencing power of the district courts. No
coordinating body or procedure is provided for by the statutes. In the
past, this state of affairs has led to successive attempts to transfer and
re-transfer inmates who do not fit the respective administrators' criteria
for confinement at the several institutions. The administration of each
institution deals only with its narrow role in the disposition of the inmate,
while the overall course of "rehabilitation" is lost in the shuffle.
These are problems which require a legislative solution. During most
of this comment, every attempt will be made to skirt these Byzantine
complications and to focus on the major problems with Wyo. STAT. § 9-6311 (1977).
WYO. STAT. §§ 14-6-201 to -243 (1978) [hereinafter cited in text as the
Act].
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trace the tortured legislative history of the statute and of
the Juvenile Court Act. The important United States Supreme Court cases of Kent v. United States19 and In Re
Gault"° and their progeny will then be discussed. The article
will show that the present uses of the statute are invalid
on three counts: (1) the legislative history/statutory interpretation; (2) the due process requirements of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (3) the equal protection requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The concluding section will briefly
set out recommendations for correcting the unacceptable
procedures currently in use.
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFER STATUTE

The practice of transferring juvenile offenders21 from
the Industrial Institute to the general population at the
Wyoming State Penitentiary has been justified as being an
administrative power necessary for the maintenance of discipline and order at the Industrial Institute. In addition,
it has been suggested, in some individual cases, that the
transfer is for the best interests of the incorrigible inmate
for whom the Institute's rehabilitative programs have been
ineffective. There can be little doubt that effective administration of a facility such as the Industrial Institute requires that there be some way to isolate and discipline disruptive inmates. 2 The Industrial Institute houses three
categories of juveniles, ranging from those who have committed serious felonies to those whose only offense is
19. Supra note 8 [hereinafter cited in text as Kent].
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited in text as Gault].
21. In this article the term juvenile offender refers to a delinquent child or a
child in need of supervision as defined by WYO. STAT. § 14-6-201 (1978)
and not to minors tried and convicted as adults.
22. These justifications offered by juvenile administrators are grounded in the
realities of an inflexible two-tiered system. When the rehabilitative institution fails to reform or restrain the juvenile, then the only other alternative is incarceration at the Penitentiary. In order to protect the treatment program at a juvenile reformatory, administrators resort to removal
of disruptive inmates. See Pirsig, The Constitutional Validity of Confining
Disruptive Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 MINN. L. REv. 101, 102-06
(1969).
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truancy, unruliness or chronic disobedience.23 Removing the
serious troublemakers from the institution altogether is, of
course, the easiest method of isolating them from the rest
of the population.
The three categories of juveniles housed at the Industrial Institute are (1) children in need of supervision;24
(2) juvenile delinquents; 5 and (3) young adults" and
juveniles who have been tried and convicted as adults 7 but
are serving all or part of their sentence in the Industrial
Institute. The provision in the Wyoming Juvenile Court
Act which allows some juveniles to be tried as adults is a
common one, found in many states' laws." This third category of juveniles may arrive at the juvenile facility by way
of two separate procedures. A brief description of the four
distinct procedural actions which may result in a juvenile
being placed in the Industrial Institute follows.
(1) Children in need of supervision are those who have
committed one of the "status offenses." 9 These offenses are
not violations of the criminal code but rather violations of
the moral or parental authority of the child's parents or of
23. The mixture of inmates has been resisted by the administrator of the Industrial Institute and has come under attack as being detrimental to the
treatment oriented objectives of the institution. WYOMING JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, AN EVALUATION, supra note 1, at 78, 266.
24. WYo. STAT. § 14-6-201(iv) (1978): "'Child in need of supervision' means
any child who is habitually truant, has run away from home or habitually
disobeys reasonable and lawful demands of his parents, guardian, custodian or other proper authority and is ungovernable and beyond control."
25. Id. § 14-6-201 (x), (ix). A delinquent child. is a person under the. age of
majority who has committed "an act punishable as a criminal offense by
the laws of this state or any -subdivision," but who is tried under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1971 and not in the adult district court proceeding.
Id.
26. WYO. STAT. § 7-13-101 (1977) allows those persons under the age of 21
who have been convicted of their first felony to be sentenced by the sentencing judge to the Industrial Institute. Originally the age limit corresponded with the age of majority but when the age of majority was lowered to 19, see Wyo. STAT. § 14-1-101 (1978), the sentencing statute kept
the old age limit, thereby creating a class of adults ages 19-20 who may
be confined at the Industrial Institute but who were not eligible to be
otherwise treated as minors.
WYO. STAT. § 7-13-102 (1977) applies to the same category of young
adults and creates the power in the Board of Parole to transfer these
19-20 year old Penitentiary inmates to the Industrial Institute.
27. WYo. STAT. §§ 7-13-101, 7-13-102 (1977), also apply -to minors tried as
adultsin district court proceedings'as provided for in WYO. STAT. § 14-6237 (1978).
28. WYO. STAT. § 14-6-237 (1978) ; Pirsig, supra note 22, at 103.
29. Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-201 (iv) (1978).
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the State. Truancy, running away, disobedience and sexual
activity are status offenses.
In the majority of cases, the Juvenile Court Act provides for an "informal but orderly" hearing to determine
whether the juvenile is in need of supervision." However,
because of an unusual provision of the Wyoming Act, the
juvenile may demand a jury trial for the determination of
the facts alleged in the petition. 1 The provision is worded
in such a way that it apparently covers all actions brought
under the Juvenile Court Act including a petition to declare
the child neglected or in need of supervision.2 A jury trial
in juvenile cases is not a constitutionally mandated right.8
The inclusion of this right in the Wyoming Juvenile Court
Act means that there are two distinct procedures that might
be followed in any juvenile proceeding: an informal hearing
by the juvenile court judge or a formal trial by jury. In
either case, the juvenile is guaranteed the right to notice
of the charges against him, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, to introduce evidence, to present
witnesses and to speak in his own behalf." These statutory
rights are also constitutionally mandated."
Once the determination is made that a juvenile is "in
need of supervision," the juvenile court judge has broad
powers to determine the custody of the child. The judge may
place the child with his parents, with any relative or other
interested person, with any public or private agency, or in
the Industrial Institute."
A "child in need of supervision" might be placed in the
custody of the Industrial Institute either directly by the
Juvenile Court Judge following the adjudicatory hearing,
or indirectly, without court supervision or approval, by
administrative transfer by the Board of Charities and Reform from one of the county homes or other court-appointed
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. §§ 14-6-224, 226.
Id. § 14-6-223.
Compare WYO. STAT. §§ 14-6-212 (1978) with id. § 14-6-223.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
WYO. STAT. § 14-6-223 (1978).
In re Gault, supra note 20, at 33, 36, 41, 56, 58.
36. WYo. STAT. § 14-6-229 (1978).
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custodians of the child. This administrative action by the
Board of Charities and Reform parallels the power the
Board has in transferring inmates of the Industrial Institute to the Penitentiary. 7
(2) The delinquent child is a minor who has committed
an act that is a crime under Wyoming criminal laws or
under the laws of the political subdivisions of the State."
If the offense was committed by an adult, it would be punishable either as a misdemeanor or a felony; the juvenile
court does not distinguish between the grades of offenses
when determining delinquency. The child charged with
delinquency has the same procedural rights as a child
charged with being in need of supervision, including the
right to demand a jury trial. Additionally, the right against
self-incrimination is also preserved by statute and by constitutional case law."3 If the child is found to be delinquent,
the court will then determine the custody and course of
rehabilitation appropriate for the individual offender. The
court has wide discretion to commit the delinquent child to
the Industrial Institute or place him with another appropriate public or private agency or with an individual. The
Act does not contain any language authorizing placement
of a delinquent child in the State Penitentiary."
(3) The juvenile tried as an adult but sentenced to the
Institute. For the same crime the child may be tried as an
adult if it is found at a transfer hearing that "the juvenile
proceedings are inappropriate under the circumstances of
the case." 1 The decision to try the minor as an adult is made
by the juvenile court judge and based on a series of factors
set out in an appendix to Kent.42 Once the case has been
37. WYo. STAT. § 14-6-229(e) (1978) provides for the transfer of custody of
a child in need of supervision or a delinquent child and gives the custodian
broad powers to determine where the child lives, etc. In the institutional
context, the Board of Charities and Reform becomes the child's custodian
and exercises its power by administrative actions which include transfer
of juveniles among the various state institutions. The Board's authority
over these institutions and over the state's children in general is found in
WYo.STAT. §§ 9-3-706 and 9-3-708 (1977).
38. WYO. STAT. § 14-6-201(ix), (x)(1978).
39. Id. § 14-6-223; In ,-e Gault, supra note 20, at 55.
40. WYO. STAT. § 14-6-229(c), (d) (1978).
41. Id. § 14-6-237. The provision for trying older and/or serious offenders as
adults is an important practical and theoretical bridge between the child
protective philosophy of the juvenile court and the criminal court philoso-
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transferred to district court, it is handled under the appropriate statutes as if the child were an adult. If the child is
found guilty in the district court, he is subject to the normal
range of penalties, including incarceration in the State
Penitentiary, probation, and various treatment programs.
In addition, the district court judge has the power to sentence a minor convicted of a felony to serve his term at the
Industrial Institute, providing he has not previously been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the
State Penitentiary." The district courts will often include
a provision in the order sentencing this category of offender
that provides for transfer from the Institute to the State
Penitentiary if the inmate fails to obey the rules of the
Institute.
(4) Juveniles tried as adults, sentenced to the Penitentiary, and transferred to the Institute. A juvenile who
was tried as an adult and sentenced to the Penitentiary
may be transferred to the Institute by the Board of Charities and Reform, providing they are under the age of 21."
This category of juveniles receives a full adult trial, just
as do those in the third group. The transfer to the Industrial
Institute is accomplished by the Board of Parole. Transfer
to the Institute is an alternative form of parole. The reasons
for transferring these juveniles from the prison to the Industrial Institute include considerations for the safety of
the juvenile, the opportunities for his rehabilitation and
administrative concerns such as the relief of overcrowding
and maintenance of order at the Penitentiary.
THE TRANSFER DECISION

In Wyoming the age of majority is 19." The Wyoming
statutory scheme provides that a juvenile offender may be
phy which balances the rights of individuals with a search for social justice. As will be seen, the philosophies behind these two systems are in
frequent conflict.
42. See supra note 8.

43. WYO.STAT. § 7-13-101 (1977).
44. Id. § 7-13-102. While this provision seems to parallel Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-101

(1977), this statute does not require that the person transferred be a firsttime offender, so that the class of transferees covered by the two statutes
differs in this respect.
45. WYo. STAT. § 14-1-101 (1978).
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.held at the Industrial Institute until he reaches the age of
21.4" Additionally, an adult under the age of 21, or a juvenile tried and convicted as an adult may be sentenced to
serve their terms in the Industrial Institute or may be
paroled to the custody of the Institute.47 Thus, the legislative
scheme allows for a transition age classification with discretion for disposition in the sentencing and in subsequent
administrative disposition of the juvenile and young adult
offenders. Yet, nowhere in this scheme is there any central
authority or guiding philosophy governing the handling of
these inmates.4" The same statutes direct the Board of Charities and Reform to "make all rules and regulations necessary and proper for the employment, discipline, instruction,
education, removal and return of all the convicts in said
institute."4 The institutional decision to recommend transferring an inmate is made by the Superintendent of the
Industrial Institute without any hearing or opportunity by
the inmate to challenge the action. The only requirement
governing the removal and return of the inmates is that
the institutional recommendation must be approved by the
Board. No written code of disciplinary regulations exists
to guide inmates at the Industrial Institute in their behavior." From the inmate's point of view, transfer is an
arbitrary punishment that. cannot be challenged or foreseen.
There is the additional problem of notice for juvenile
offenders from the first two categories. Since juvenile court
46. Id. § 14-6-231 (a).
47. Wyo. STAT. §,§7-13-101 and 7-13-102 (1977) provide only that the terms
at the Institute may not exceed the length of the Penitentiary terms set
at the original sentencing. Thus, these people could properly remain at
the Institute long after their twenty-first birthday. Such a situation would
complicate the running of the Institute and would probably be resisted by
the administration. The author knows of no such case.
48. This lack of coordination and guiding philosophy characterizes the Wyoming juvenile system. The major recommendations of the recent study of
the state's juvenile justice system were centered around these issues. See
WYOMING

JUVENILE JUSTICE

SYSTEM,

AN

EVALUATION,

supra note

1,

at

254-270.
49. WYO. STAT. § 9-6-311(b) (1977). The wording of this statute only refers
to making rules for transferred convicts. It is likely a court would give a
broader reading of the directive so that it covers all the inmates of the
Industrial Institute. The only other authority for rulemaking is the very
general supervisory authority granted the Board of Charities and Reform
in WYO. STAT. §§ 9-3-706 and 9-3-707 (1977).
50. Requests for copies of disciplinary rules at the state's juvenile institutions
made during August of 1981 were met with the reply that a disciplinary
code was being prepared for the Children's Home but that no code existed
for the Industrial Institute and none was planned.
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judges have no authority to sentence delinquent children or
children in need of supervision to the State Penitentiary,
these juveniles are not put on notice that the proceedings
against them might result in imprisonment unless the judge
explains the workings of the Institutional Transfer Statute. 1 Judges frequently take the position that post-committal transfer is a wholly administrative concern beyond
the powers the courts are given under the Juvenile Court
Act; and, therefore, they make no mention of it.5"
The differing methods of sentencing juveniles and
adults give rise to further uncertainties and inequities. A
minor who has been tried as an adult in a district court
proceeding receives a sentence specifying a minimum and
maximum time that may be served. Whether the time is
served in the county jail, the Penitentiary or in the Industrial Institute, the time limit may not be expanded beyond
the maximum by the administrators of the institution in
which he is held. In the case of the adults and of juveniles
convicted as adults, their sentences are set by the convicting
judge and, therefore, they are eligible to participate in
earning good time credits and to be considered for parole
once they are placed at the Penitentiary.
A delinquent child or a child in need of supervision
placed in the custody of Industrial Institute normally receives an indeterminant sentence. 4 The length of confinement is determined by the Superintendent of the Industrial
Institute depending on the effectiveness of rehabilitation,
the juvenile's prospects if released, and the institution's
need for space. If the juvenile is transferred to the State
Penitentiary, he still maintains his indeterminant sentence.
51.

While it may seem incredible that a child in need of supervision might end
up in prison, there is at least one reported case of a neglected child who
was administratively transferred to an adult reformatory. See Wintjen v.
State, 433 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1968).
52. In this way, the juvenile court judges correctly interpret their own statutory authority but ignore the reality of the juveniles' predicament. Furthermore, they are turning a blind eye to the unconstitutional transfer of
inmates. While it would be going beyond the case before them to attack
the transfer practices, they participate in concealing the danger of imprisonment from the juvenile.
53. WYO. STAT. §§ 7-13-101 to -102 (1977).
54. Id. § 14-6-231 (1978).
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The Board of Parole which oversees probation, parole, and
good time release has no authority to set a release date for
the juvenile offender transferred to the Penitentiary.55
The Board of Charities and Reform retains supervision
of the juveniles and young adults transferred from the
Industrial Institute to the Penitentiary." The juvenile offender held in prison is not only excluded from early release
programs but has an indefinite period of time to serve, the
only terminal date coming on the inmate's twenty-first
birthday. 7 Thus, a minor adjudged delinquent at the age
of 16 for a misdemeanor might find himself held briefly in
the Industrial Institute and then in the State Penitentiary
for up to five years. The maximum sentence for a misdemeanor is 90 days in a county jail and judges frequently
give lighter sentences for such a crime depending on the
circumstances."
Indeterminant sentences have long been upheld by
courts in juvenile cases on the theory that the juvenile is
not being punished for a crime but rather is being confined for rehabilitation.59 This may make some sense when
the juvenile is at a special rehabilitation facility, but once
the juvenile is transferred to the general population of the
State Penitentiary, the distinction loses whatever logic it
might have had.6" In order to justify these inequities, the
State maintains that the transfer is not a change in the
original judgment of the court but rather only a change in
55. Attorneys General Opinion No. 1 (Jan. 3, 1974), supra note 12, appears
to be correct in respect to this question. See also Uram v. Roach, supra
note 14.
56. WYo. STAT. § 9-6-311 (a) (1977).
57. Id. § 14-6-231 (1978).
58. The very mitigating circumstances that might convince a judge to give a
lighter sentence are often the indicators that would recommend treatment
at a reform institution. For instance, the fact that a juvenile offender had
been abused by his parents would indicate leniency if he was being sentenced to serve time in a penal institution but would indicate institutionalization in a juvenile proceeding.
59. Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (opinion of
then Circuit Court Judge Warren Burger).
60. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1123-25 (2d Cir. 1974);
see also Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 568, §§ 3, 4 (1979). Generally, the cases hold
that there must be express statutory authority for housing juveniles at an
adult facility and that when they are housed there, they must be segregated from the general population. The cases cover a wide range of statutory schemes. Most of the cases are prior to 1966 and must be considered
in light of subsequent Untied States Supreme Court decisions.
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the administration of the court's judgment. 1 By this circuitous route, the juvenile's confinement at the Penitentiary
becomes rehabilitative rather than penal.
It can be seen then that the process of transferring
inmates between the Industrial Institute and the State
Penitentiary is characterized by an informal decision on
the part of the heads of the two institutions who request
the Board of Charities and Reform to transfer the person
in question. This request is acted on without a hearing by
the Board in one of its regular business meetings. Regardless of which category of offender the inmate falls under,
he has no representation at any level of the process. But in
several important respects those juveniles who were tried
and convicted as adults are in a better position once they
are transferred to the State Penitentiary.
THE HISTORY OF WYOMING JUVENILE LAW
AND W.S.

9-6-311

The juvenile court movement which swept the country
at the turn of the century was one of the most immediately
successful movements in the age of reform. 6' The impetus

for the massive reorganization of the criminal legal system
can be found in the changes in the social perspective on
childhood. By the nineteenth century, America and the rest
of the industrial world had discovered childhood. The development of the concept of childhood had taken over 400 years
and corresponded with the radical changes in the society
that had been brought about with the industrialization of
the economy and the urbanization of the population. Even
in the early seventeenth century children were viewed as
being part of the overall economy of the society; they were
61. Attorneys General Opinion No. 1 (Jan. 3, 1974), supra note 12, at 82.

62. The literature on the political, philosophical and historical aspects of childhood and the development of the juvenile justice system is plentiful. The
account given in this article is derived primarily from L. EMPEY, D. ROTHMAN & T.
-IRSHI, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS 3-69, 183-212 (L. Empey ed. 1979) and W. STAPLETON & L.
TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 1-48 (1972). See also In re Gault,

supra note 20; A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969). For those interested in a more in depth look at these subjects, each of the previously

mentioned works is well documented and will provide an opening for endless study.
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not segregated from adults and shared the same freedoms,
rights and duties as did adults. They also were treated as
equals before the law except that a very young child was
presumed to be incapable of committing a crime. But although they had a full participatory role in society, children
had little, if any, social status. They were dependent either
on their families or on masters to whom they were apprenticed. Apprenticeship, and even slavery, were the precursers
of the child labor practices which came under attack by the
progressives at the turn of the century. Historically, the
primary attitude toward children was one of indifference,
tempered with exploitation.
The change in the social perception of childhood
stretched over 400 years beginning in the Renaissance.
On the eve of the twentieth century there was a firmly
established idea that childhood was a period of life distinct
from adulthood with its own expectations and rules. Childhood was a time of innocence, which meant a time when
children must be molded into proper adults or else be lost
to indolence, dishonesty, promiscuity and laziness. The ideal
child was to be "submissive to authority, hard working,
self-controlled, modest and chaste." Parents and schools
were now considered responsible for the production of children who measured up to the new standard. It is no surprise
that, when the progressive reform movement set out to
attack a legal system which still treated most children as
if they were adults,63 it was able to mobilize public opinion
and bring about reform in every state within 20 years.
The main instrument of reform was the juvenile court
which was to have extraordinary powers to intervene in the
life of the child not to punish violations of criminal laws,
but to rehabilitate the child and to keep order. This new
court was to direct the children to social workers and to
63.

At common law a child under the age of seven was presumed to be unable
to form the intent to commit a crime, and a youth over the age of 14 was
presumed capable of forming criminal intent. No other doctrine existed to
isolate children from the full force of the criminal justice system. In re
Gault, supra note 20, at 16. Historians disagree as to the practical results
of trying children as adults, but by the turn of the century the popular
opinion was strongly against the practice. See authorities cited supra
note 62.
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the child protective institutions both public and private
which would take the place of the parents who had failed.
The juvenile court would operate on equitable principles
rather than on the traditional tenets of the criminal law.
The jury trial was deemed unnecessary as was the strict
adherence to the rules of evidence and procedure. The requirement of public proceedings was deemed to leave a
stigma on the child was an ongoing punishment and since
the object was rehabilitation and not punishment, the proceedings were made secret. The abridgement of traditional
legal rights was so drastic that the noted American legal
scholar Roscoe Pound warned: "the powers of the court
of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those
of [the American] juvenile courts." 4
Such a complete revision of legal institutions and rights
required the support of an equally broad based legal theory.
To supply the theoretic underpinnings of the new system,
the progressives dusted off the medieval legal concept of
parens patriae. Parenspatriaeoriginally described the right
of the feudal landholder to take the children from his feudal
tenants if the children failed to produce their required share
due to a failure of parental supervision. This feudal economic theory was based on the supposed contract between
feudal landholder and peasant. It was transformed by the
reformers into a doctrine that conceived of the state as the
ever present superparent, overseeing each parent-child relationship, ready to intervene at the early indications of
failure. The child was the passive object of the new system
and was denied any active participation in the determination of his fate. The State took on the role of the late nineteenth century parent complete with arbitrary and undisputed powers of discipline and control.65
64. In re Gault, supra note 20, at 18 (Quoting Roscoe Pound).
65. The fact that this paternalistic legal theory gained universal acceptance
during a period when the rights of adults were being greatly expanded
indicates that the new concept of childhood did not encompass a role for
the child as a citizen or even as a "person" if that word is used in its
constitutional sense. While the aim of the reformers was to stop exploitation, they also denied children any power to defend themselves against
abuse by the new system.
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The practicalities of American reform politics encouraged the reformers to portray the problems and solutions in simplified stereotypical fashion. Childhood was
defined as a single period reaching from birth to the
legislated age of majority. The causes of delinquency were
said to be environmental and psychological, which in practice meant it was primarily understood to be a problem of
the emigrant and working classes. Absolute faith was
placed in the social worker, the probation officer and the
child protective institutions to cure the defective conditions
in the child's environment. The time was ripe for a new
system and the reformers presented a daring solution in a
forceful and popular manner; it is, therefore, little surprise
that the movement gained immediate and nearly universal
support. This enthusiastic popular perception of the juvenile
court system lasted long after statistics and studies led
scholars and workers in the juvenile field to criticize the
juvenile system from a wide variety of political and philosophical points of view. 6
In Wyoming reform was ushered in over a period of
years beginning in 1888 when the Territorial Legislature
passed a statute which provided that minors under 16 convicted of their first offense could serve their term in a
reform institution in another state. 7 In 1909, the State
Legislature empowered the Board of Charities and Reform to
confine convicted young adults in the state "reformatory." 8
66. The early universal success of the juvenile justice system is matched today
by universal dissatisfaction. One scholar recently reviewed the history of
theory on the causes and treatment of juvenile delinquency during the
twentieth century. He summarized his view of 80 years of theory and
practice by saying that "we are left with a choice of illusions" and by
comparing the juvenile justice system with the proud but naked emperor
who was "despite his posturing, pretty damned ridiculous." L. EMPEY,
D. ROTHMAN & T. HIRSCHI, supra note 62, at 212. Another author,
writing from a law enforcement perspective, acknowledges the criticisms
of the liberals and conservatives, but suggest that the progressive concept
of juvenile justice has never been given a fair opportunity to operate
according to its principles. P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AND THE
LAW 319 (1978).
67. 1888 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 57, at 130.
68. 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 90, at 137. This statute allowed first offenders
aged 16 to 25 to serve their term at the Industrial Institute. These inmates
were young adult convicts who had been given a full criminal trial. No
state reformatory was created until 1927 when a separate building at the
Industrial Institute was set aside for the housing of "prisoners" transferred from the Penitentiary to the Institute. 1927 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.
49, at 48; WYO. STAT. §§ 9-6-201 to -202 (1977). Until 1927 the Industrial
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In 1911, the Industrial Institute was created, apparently to
handle this category of "youthful first offenders." 9 In 1913,
the Institutional Transfer Statute was passed to provide a
way to return inmates of the Industrial Institute to the
Penitentiary if they were unruly or were found not to be
first offenders.7 ° It wasn't until 1915, however, that the
legislature provided for a separate judicial treatment for
juveniles and created a category of offenders distinct from
adult felons and misdemeanants."' By 1945, "delinquent
children" were regularly housed at the Industrial Institute
along with those young adult offenders for whom the Institute was originally established. Not until 1951 did the
Institute apparently served as the reformatory but even it was not established until 1911. See infra note 69.
69. 1911 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 107, at 180. This law seems to limit the inmates
of the Industrial Institute to those described in note 68, supra, by incorporation of the definition found in Wyo. COMP. STAT. § 540 (1910). The
Industrial Institute was not actually built until sometime after 1913. See
1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws eh. 63, at 53.
70. 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, §§ 10, 11, at 56; WYO. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977)
(hereinafter referred to in the text as Institutional Transfer Statute).
71. 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 99, at 113. The delinquent child defined by this
Act included both delinquent children and children in need of supervision
in current statutory terminology. The Act allowed for these children to be
placed with "child-caring agencies, societies or institutions" but did not
include the Industrial Institute in the definition of such agencies. The
category of "delinquent children" must be carefully distinguished from
"juvenile delinquents" defined in WYO. COMP. STAT. § 3127 (1910). In
1931, "juvenile delinquents" were persons under the age of 16 who had
been tried and convicted in a regular adult proceeding. They were subject
to the normal range of penalties given adult offenders, including imprisonment at the Penitentiary. Additionally, the trial judge could sentence
them to serve their term at a reform school or the Industrial Institute.
72. See Wyo. CoMP. STAT. §§ 58-613, 19-1301 (1945)

and accompanying editor's

notes. No statute was ever passed that allowed the statutorily defined
"delinquent children" to be housed at the Industrial Institute. See supra
note 71. The compiler of the 1945 statute took the 1911 Act creating the
Industrial Institute as authority for changing an earlier law allowing for
placement of 14-year-olds in reform schools to provide for placement in
the Industrial Institute. Compare Wyo. CoMP. STAT. 1945 § 58-613 with
Wyo. COMP. STAT. 1920 § 3892. A statute passed in 1913 states that
"juvenile delinquents" may be housed at the Industrial Institute. 1913
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 8. These "juvenile delinquents" are not the
"delinquent children" defined in the 1915 Act, see supra note 71; but,
rather, they are young offenders tried and convicted in adult proceedings.
See supra note 68. The category of "delinquent children" did not exist in
1913, while that of juvenile delinquents did. When the class of "delinquent
children" was created by the legislature, no provision was made for placing
them at the Institute. See supra note 71.
The 1945 compiler confused the two separate categories of "delinquent
children" and "juvenile delinquents." See supra note 71. By doing so, he
made imprisonment at the Industrial Institute for "delinquent children"
appear to be statutorily authorized when the legislature had never acted
to do so. The compiler of the 1920 statutes had not made the change even
though the statute relied on by the 1945 compiler had been passed in 1911.
The compiler of the 1945 statutes may have been acting to conform the
statutes to the then current realities since no legislative enactment sup-
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legislature finally create a separate juvenile court system
with distinct powers to adjudicate the delinquency and
custody of minors.73 This system survived with some mod-

ifications until 1971, when the legislature attempted a
complete overhaul of the juvenile court system. 4
With the Juvenile Court Act of 1971 the Wyoming

Legislature was responding not to a broad based political
movement but, rather, to the recent United States Supreme
Court rulings in Kent 5 and Gault. 6 The rulings of nine
judges in 1965 and 1967 would change the course of juvenile
law almost as radically as the popular movement of 65 years
before. 7 In Kent and Gault, the Supreme Court attacked
the theory of parens patriae. Juvenile proceedings no matter

what their purpose frequently result in the substantial loss
of freedoms and rights that the juvenile would normally
have. To deny the juvenile offender the traditional constitutional protections is to deny the juvenile the due process
of the laws. 8 The Court did not reject parens patriae al-

together but rather said that some rights remained intact
while others were subject to reconsideration in light of the
nature of the juvenile proceedings.'

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

Thus, in these decisions

ports this substantive change in the statutes. If so, this change in practice
came sometime after 1934 when the Wyoming Supreme Court declared:
"The Wyoming Industrial Institute is a reformatory for the custody and
discipline of those persons under the age of 25 years . . . who have not
theretofore been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the
state penitentiary." Uram v. Roach, supra note 14, at 794. The Juvenile
Court Act of 1951 was the first positive legislative enactment which provided for the placement of juveniles at the Industrial Institute. 1951 Wyo.
Sess. Laws ch. 124, § 12, at 194.
This gradual shift in the use of the Institute, first as a penal institution and later as a juvenile reformatory, complicated the intrepretation of
the statue and case law relating to the housing and transfer of inmates at
the Institute.
1951 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 125, at 190.
WYo. STAT. §§ 14-6-201 to -243 (1978 & Supp. 1981). See also Comment,
The Wyoming Juvenile Court Act of 1871, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237
(1973).
Kent v. United States, supra note 8.
In re Gault, supra note 20.
Kent and Gault attacked the foundations of the juvenile justice system but
did not destroy it. There is disagreement as to whether the change has been
primarily the formalities observed by the authorities or whether there is a
substantive change in the way cases are handled and decided. The Supreme
Court has generally adhered to the course it set in the mid-60's but has
occasionally raised doubts in some subsequent decisions. N. SCHULTZ &
F. COHEN, PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 22-29 (M. Rosenheim ed.
1976).
In re Gault, supra note 20, at 27-28.
Id. at 22.
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and subsequent ones, the Court affirmed the juvenile's right
to counsel, to present evidence and confront witnesses, and
to be free from self-incrimination, but did not require the
juvenile be given a jury trial in a delinquency proceeding, 0
nor hold that the rules of evidence apply in full force.8 ' The
result of these decisions was to force basic revisions in the
juvenile laws of the 50 states. Juveniles were granted rights
that had been denied them since the turn of the century.
In fact, during the 65 years of the juvenile court era, the
concept of adult due process rights had been expanded while
the juveniles' due process rights had all but been abolished."2
Wyoming's legislative response" to these decisions
seems at first glance to be an attempt at a comprehensive
treatment of the State juvenile justice system."4 But the
provisions for administrative transfer to and from the Industrial Institute were never a part of the original juvenile
code and were not examined or considered as part of the
new Juvenile Court Act.8" The confused language of the 1913
Institutional Transfer Statute and its companion statutes 6
remained intact and stood in strong contrast to the provi80. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra note 33.
81. This appears to be an open question. The Supreme Court did constitutionalize the juvenile's right to confront and present witnesses in In re
Gault, supra note 20, at 56, and cited with approval a law review casenote
which called for adherence to the hearsay rules except to the extent that
they are "merely technical." Id. at 11 n.7.
82. In describing the workings of the doctrine of parens patriae, Justice Fortas
wrote: "[The state] does not deprive the child of any rights, because he
has none. It merely provides the 'custody' to which the child is entitled."
Id. at 17. This statement was a paraphrase of an article published in the
American Bar AssociationJournal in 1962. Id. at 17 n.21.
83. The Juvenile Court Act of 1971, WYO. STAT. §§ 14-6-201 to -234 (1978 &
Supp. 1981).
84. The problems of the Juvenile Court Act of 1971 extend beyond those discussed in this comment. Because the Juvenile Courts are not given exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile matters a number of minor courts also
exercise jurisdiction over juvenile matters. See WYOMING JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, AN EVALUATION, supra note 1, at 52-58, 262.
85. WYO. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977) is located in Title 9, Administration of Government, under Chapter 6, State Institutions. WYO. STAT. §§ 7-13-101 and
7-13-102 (1977) are found in Title 7, Criminal Procedure, under Chapter
13, Sentence, Imprisonment, Parole and Pardon.
The location of these statutes under these headings is not merely
accidental. It indicates that they were designed to serve the purposes of
efficient penal administration and were never integrated into the Juvenile
Court Act. Consequently, the legislature never addressed the problems that
arise when the unrestricted transfer provisions come in conflict with the
Juvenile Court Act's underlying philosophy of guaranteeing the juvenile
offender his due process protections.
86. See supra note 17.
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sions of the Juvenile Court Act which attempted to exhaustively enumerate the juvenile court's powers. Furthermore,
there was no sense of the growing body of constitutional
due process law governing administrative dispositions involving prisoner's liberty interests in the transfer provisions.
The statutes which were originally drafted in the early days
of the first wave of reform were left untouched in the second
and third important revisions of the juvenile law. In practice, the application of the statute amounts to a complete
grant of arbitrary power to dispose of the affected juveniles
in whatever manner the administrators of the Industrial
Institute and the State Penitentiary see fit.
This brings us to a consideration of the Institutional
Transfer Statute itself. It was passed by the legislature in
1913 as part of the legislation which established the Industrial Institute.s7 The language of the law published in the
Session Laws of Wyoming, 1913, differs only in technical
details from the statute now published as W.S. 9-6-311
(1977). It now reads:
Transfer of inmates to Penitentiary or Wyoming
State Hospital; return to institute.
(a) The State Board of Charities and Reform shall
have the power to transfer to the State Penitentiary, or in case an inmate shall become mentally
incompetent, to the Wyoming State Hospital, any
inmate, who subsequent to his committal, shall be
shown to have been, at the time of his conviction,
an adult, or to have been previously convicted of
crime, and may also so transfer any apparently
incorrigible prisoner, whose presence in the institute appears to be seriously detrimental to the wellbeing of the institute; and said State Board of
Charities and Reform, by written requisition, may
require the return to the institute of any person
who may have been so transferred.
(b) The Board of Charities and Reform shall also
have power to make all rules and regulations necessary and proper for the employment, discipline,
87. 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 10, at 56.
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instruction, education, removal, and return as
aforesaid of all the convicts in said institute."
At first glance, the statute appears to authorize the administrative transfer of any juvenile inmate from the Industrial
Institute to the State Penitentiary, but even this interpretation is open to question. The Industrial Transfer Statute
is open to attack on at least three grounds: on the question
of its correct interpretation; on the failure to conform to
the requirements of constitutional due process; and because
it denies the equal protction of the law.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The problem of legislative intent can be stated reasonably simply but the solution the courts will adopt is difficult
to predict since extrinsic evidence of legislative intent is
nonexistent, and the statute itself may be read in contradictory ways without doing obvious violence to the texts
involved. Briefly stated, the argument is that the 1913 law
was passed prior to the introduction of the current concept
of juvenile delinquent to the Wyoming legal system. The
section of the 1913 law entitled "Who May Be Imprisoned"
defined two separate categories of inmates: those who had
been "convicted" and who were to be "imprisoned," and
"juvenile delinquents" who were to be "confined' at the
Industrial Institute."' The question is to whom do these
categories of inmates refer. Does the statute apply to any
person legally housed at the Industrial Institute or was the
intent of the legislature to single out a more restricted
category of inmates, those who had been convicted of a
violation of the criminal code? The problem is greatly confused by the proliferation of contradictory statutes dealing
with minors and young offenders. The legislature's distressing habit of passing new statutes but never repealing or
revising the outmoded ones makes the usual problems of
determining the legislative intent of state statutes even
more bewildering. 0
88.

WYO. STAT. § 9-6-311 (1977).

89. 1913 Wyo. SESS. LAws ch. 63, § 8, at 55.
90. See supra notes 68, 71-72.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 11

664

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

The Institutional Transfer provision of the 1913 law
refers variously to "any inmate," "any inmate... at the time
of his conviction" and "any apparently incorrigible prisoner." Sorting out the various dependent clauses in the

statute, a reasoned interpretation would read: (1) any
inmate may be transferred to the Wyoming State Hospital
if he has become insane (now mentally incompetent) ; (2)
any convicted inmate may be transferred to the State Penitentiary if he is shown to have a previous conviction or is
over the age of 25 (now 21); and (3) any incorrigible
prisoner may be transferred to the State Penitentiary if he

is shown to be seriously detrimental to the well being of the
Institute. In 1913, all of the inmates who were statutorily
authorized to be confined at the Industrial Institute had
received full criminal trials as adults. In fact, the best
reading of the statutes indicates that a full adult criminal
adjudication existed until the creation of the juvenile court

system in 1951.91 When the juvenile court system was
created, juvenile proceedings became equitable and not criminal. 2 Even today with the reassertion of constitutional due
process protections in juvenile proceedings, the adjudication
in most instances does not amount to a full trial." Equally
important, the juvenile being processed through the system
91. See id. In 1915 the new category of juvenile delinquent included those
under the age of 21 who had been convicted of a felony after receiving a
full trial. This category remained unaffected by the passage of the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 which set up the first separate juvenile court
system in the state. Following the Juvenile Court Act of 1951, there were
two independent and somewhat conflicting statutes defining juvenile delinquents. Wyo. COMP. STAT. §§ 14-35, 14-41 (1957). When the Institutional
Transfer Statute is considered, there are three separate procedural routes
by which the same juvenile could be sentenced directly to the Industrial
Institute. In all but one of the procedures, the inmate received a full trial.
That procedure was under the Juvenile Court Act of 1951, Wyo. COMP.
STAT. § 14-41 (1957).
The conflicting definitions finally fell when the new Juvenile Court
Act of 1971 established definitions for the delinquent child and the person
in need of supervision to take the place of the old single category. Wyo.
STAT. § 14-6-201 (1978). Under the 1971 Act, a delinquent child was not
convicted of a criminal offense and had usually bypassed the opportunity
for a full trial that was an integral part of the determination of delinquency in 1913.
92. 1951 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 125, § 11(c), at 194; WYo. STAT. § 14-6-238
(1978).
93. WYO. STAT. § 14-6-224 (1978) provides for an informal hearing unless a
trial is demanded within ten days after the accused is advised of his right
to trial pursuant to Wyo. S.TAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1978). The uninformed
election of the informal hearing cannot serve as a valid waiver of the
juvenile's due process rights in the same way that a plea of guilty by an
informed and competent person will.
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is led to believe that this is a less serious proceeding than
an adult trial. The juvenile delinquent under the current
law is in a significantly different position than the delinquent juvenile described in the 1913 law. Indeed, the "delinquent juvenile" of 1913 is almost identical to the minor who
is tried as an adult and sentenced to the Industrial Institute
under the current statutory scheme. The present day juvenile
delinquent resembles more closely the "delinquent child" in
the statutory language of 1909, though the comparison can
be distinguished on several points.
When the legislature adopted the Juvenile Court Act of
1971, it intended to substitute a single coherent statutory
scheme for the incomplete patchwork that characterized
juvenile law in Wyoming up to that time.94 The extensive
enumeration of the powers of the juvenile courts did not
include the power to commit the juvenile delinquent to the
Penitentiary. Under the Act delinquents may be held in
the "county jail or another restrictive facility" for only a
period of no more than ten days providing they are strictly
segregated from adult prisoners. 6 The statutes state that
the juvenile proceeding is equitable and not criminal and
that the juvenile incurs no civil disability by operation of
the Act.9" Taken together, these provisions clearly indicate
that delinquent juveniles were to be treated as a noncriminal class for whom confinement in the Penitentiary would
be contrary to the intent of the Juvenile Court Act and
beyond the powers vested in the juvenile courts.
When the Institutional Transfer Statute was passed,
delinquent juveniles were convicted of crimes in the regular
course of adult criminal proceedings. The legislature was
providing a mechanism for the administrative imposition
of a sentence that the judiciary had been legislatively authorized to levy. 8 In many cases, the inmate had initially been
sentenced to the Penitentiary and then administratively
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See eupra note 1.
WYo. STAT. § 14-6-229 (1978).
Id. § 14-6-229(c) (ii).
Id. § 14-6-238.
Uram v. Roach, supra note 14.
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transferred to "the reformatory."99 In such a case, the
administrative power to transfer the inmate back to the
Penitentiary is the logical and proper corollary to the
original transfer power. In both types of cases the administrative power is co-extensive with the judicial sentencing
authority.
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld this use of the
statute in the 1934 case of Uram v. Roach.' The facts of
the case illustrate the proper application of the statute. But
while the holding in the case was substantially correct, the
opinion contains misleading dicta which has been relied on
by corrections administrators to justify improper transfers.
In Uram, a man who called himself John Spaulding was
arrested, tried and convicted of burglary. When asked by the
judge, Spaulding said he was 18 years old and that this was
his first felony conviction. In light of this, the judge sentenced the man to an indeterminant sentence in the Wyoming Industrial Institute. Since the trip from Lincoln
County Courthouse in Kemmerer to Worland was a two-day
affair in 1928, he was sent to the Institute in Worland by
way of the Penitentiary in Rawlins. At the Penitentiary
John Spaulding was recognized to be Mike Uram, a former
prisoner at the Penitentiary and a two-time felon. Without
a hearing, the Board of Charities and Reform ordered Uram
to serve his sentence at the State Penitentiary. Furthermore,
the Board fixed a minimum and maximum sentence.
Under the committing statute, Uram could not properly
be sentenced to the Industrial Institute.' This is one of
the three express instances covered under the Institutional
Transfer Statute, allowing for transfer in the case of improper sentencing.' ° Unlike the case of Larry B., Uram
was tried and convicted under the criminal code and the
judge was empowered to sentence him to prison."' If Uram
99. WYO. COMP. STAT. § 545 (1910) (current version at WYO. STAT. § 7-13-102
(1977)).
100. Supra note 14.
101. Wyo. REV. STAT. § 80-301 (1931) (current Version at WYo. STAT. § 7-13-101
(1977)).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
103. Uram v. Roach, supra note 14, at 793-94.
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was a first offender between the ages of 16 and 25, then
the judge could sentence him to the Industrial Institute.
By statute this last act was discretionary; it was and is
within the power of the judge to sentence an 18-year-old
first offender to the Penitentiary."'
In reviewing the case, the Wyoming Supreme Court
upheld the administrative change of sentence on the theory
that the published statutes of the state were incorporated
into the sentence given at trial. '0 5 The sentence to the Industrial Institute was thereby made conditional on the existence of the statutory preconditions. The court held that the
administrative determination of those facts was not a judicial act but properly within the scope of the administrative
power delegated to the executive by the legislature." 6 While
the last point could be quibbled with, this far into the court's
opinion the theory is sound and would hold up under contemporary analysis. Unfortunately, the court went on to
analyze the need for a due process hearing in a manner that
can best be described as dated and misconceived. The court
admitted that due process notice and hearing were sometimes required even in administrative hearings but denied
that those procedures were required in Uram's case.1"'
The court offered two justifications for denying the
due process hearing to Uram. First the court said the due
process protections did not attach when transferring convicts
from "one penal or reformatory institution to another.""1 '
The important question under federal constitutional analysis
is whether the transferor and transferee institutions can be
considered functionally similar or whether they serve distinct purposes. If the institutions are functionally distinct,
then the inmate has a protectable liberty interest in the
question of transfer and due process protections are mandated. 9 The court was substantially correct in saying that
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 794.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
The concept of functionally distinct institutions was first announced in
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1966). In Baxatrom, the United
States Supreme Court used equal protection analysis to invalidate a New
York State procedure for the administrative transfer of prisoners from
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transfer from one adult penal institution to another did not
give rise to a fully protectable liberty interest. The problem
turns on the characterization of the Industrial Institute as
an adult penal institution rather than as a juvenile reform
institution. The court did not discuss this problem directly
but indicated that institutions were sufficiently similar to
allow for unfettered administrative transfer. Rather than
analyze this issue in depth, the court confused the question
of whether a substantial liberty interest against transfer
existed when an offender was properly held in the Industrial
the penitentiary to the mental hospital. The Court said New York must
provide the same procedural protections to the imprisoned convict that
were provided at the regular civil commitment proceeding. The court rejected the argument that the person serving a prison sentence was not
entitled to the full range of civil rights because of his conviction and
sentence to confinement at a penal institution. The Court held that the
liberty interest at stake was different from the one that had been adjudicated at the original trial, and therefore the convict was entitled to a
separate determination of his mental condition. Recently, lower courts
have applied the doctrine to distinguish between juvenile reformatories
and prisons. See Pirsig, supra note 22, at 136-39, and cases cited therein.
When this doctrine is applied to the question of transferring juveniles to
adult penal institutions, the standard is whether the juvenile transferred
to prison has received substantially the same procedural rights and protections as have the adults who were convicted and sentenced directly to
the Penitentiary.
The doctrine is closely related to the more traditional due process
analysis which looks to see if the juvenile will incur a substantial loss
of liberty or an additional stigma by the transfer. Once it is determined
that there is a liberty interest at stake, then the juvenile is entitled to due
process proceedings sufficient to protect the liberty interest. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). While in the case of juvenile offenders
transferred to penal institutions, both equal protection analysis and due
process analysis mandate certain procedures be given the juvenile, there
is a difference in what procedures are required by each analysis. Equal
protection requires that the same procedural rights be given all people
faced with the loss of the same liberty interest. Even if those procedures
are granted to only a limited class of people by statute, court rule or
common law, they must be given to every person in a similar situation.
Due process protections are mandated by the Constitution according to the
importance of the liberty interest involved. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. Due
process proceedings are not derived from statutes or nonconstitutionally
based court rulings.
In the area of the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult penal institutions, the differences between the intended functions of the adult prison
and the juvenile reformatory will trigger both equal protection analysis
and due process analysis. The juvenile justice system is a rehabilitative
system in which the punitive and stigmatizing aspects are minimized. The
Industrial Institute is clearly a juvenile institution in 1982, regardless of
its original role. See supra note 72. Placement in the Penitentiary involves
a significant loss of liberty and an increased stigmatization. While many
authorities have been critical of the apparent failure of juvenile institutions to reform delinquents and of the excessively penal nature of these
institutions, see In re Gault, supra note 20, at 18-27, no court can equate
a juvenile institution to an adult penal institution without granting full
criminal trial rights to any juvenile. To deny that there is a functional
difference between the Industrial Institute and the State Penitentiary invalidates the basic assumptions of the juvenile system. See Carter v.
United States, eupra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Institute with the second issue, namely, that Uram never
made a valid claim to that liberty interest. This second line
of reasoning is the correct basis for the decision in Uram
regardless of the result of the analysis of the liberty interest
at stake in the transfer.
In making his appeal, Mike Uram admitted that he was
previously convicted of a felony and that he had deceived
the trial judge into the improper sentence." ' He claimed that
the transfer amounted to an administrative change of sentence which was an improper exercise of judicial power and
that he could only be resentenced by the courts. 1 ' While the
court did strike down the administrative imposition of a
minimum and maximum sentence on this very theory, it
upheld the transfer as being within the "conditional sentence" handed down by the judge and supplemented by the
statutory transfer provision. 1 2 The court correctly noted
that Uram was not a member of the statutorily created class
of first offenders who were eligible to serve their sentence
at the Industrial Institute. Uram made only a technical
claim that he received an improper sentence and did not
challenge his conviction or the substantive propriety of the
sentence. Since he did not deny these facts, he had not placed
a liberty interest in question and the Board's application of
the transfer power required no judicial determination. The
court noted that if Uram had denied the conditional facts
that required transfer, then a due process hearing would be
required."1
The decision was correctly founded on this reasoning
and the court need never have reached the question of
whether transfer from the Industrial Institute to the State
Penitentiary was merely a transfer from one penal institution to another. Since the court never examined this issue,
the brief statement to that effect found in Uram should
properly be considered as dicta. Thus, the result in Uram
can be defended under current constitutional analysis if
110.
111.
112.
113.

Uram v. Roach, aupra note 14, at 794.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 796.
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correctly read. Unfortunately, the current policy of the
Board of Charities and Reform and the superintendent of
the Industrial Institute is to deny all due process protections
to prospective transferees, citing the dicta in Uram as supThis reliance is without foundation
porting their actions. 114
law.
case
in the current
Uram v. Roach correctly indicates that the statute will

remain valid in at least three types of cases that are still
likely to arise. The first is in the Uram fact situation where
the person is convicted in a district court proceeding but is
sentenced to the Industrial Institute on the basis of false
information, making him ineligible in law for the less restrictive sentence. As the court noted in Uram, if the conditional facts are disputed by the prisoner, he must be granted
a due process hearing for their determination.11
The second type of case includes those juveniles who
were transferred from the Penitentiary to the Institute by
the Board of Charities and Reform. The administrative
transfer power in these cases should properly be a two-way
street. Since the juveniles were originally sentenced to the
Penitentiary, no challenge can be made that their sentence
has been improperly altered by administrative action. This
power is analogous to parole and parole revocation powers

which are regularly entrusted to administrative agencies."'
In order to transfer this class of juveniles, a due process
hearing must be granted by the Board.1 7
114. In discussing due process and equal protection rights, the Wyoming court
cited only WYO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3 & 10, and the discussion of federal
cases is kept to a minimum. Uram v. Roach, supra note 14, at 795-96.
115. Uram v. Roach, supra note 14, at 795-96.
116. WYO. STAT. §§ 7-13-401 to -422 (1977); see also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
117. Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 116, at 487-88. The procedure described is
initiated by the Board of Parole under Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-102 (1977).
There can be no doubt that this is a type of parole even if the revocation
process is handled by the Board of Charities and Reform. One alternative
is to allow the Board of Parole to maintain jurisdiction over this class of
prisoners and to handle them through the normal parole revocation process.
The power to transfer the inmate back to the Penitentiary could be found
in WYO. STAT. § 7-13-403 (1977). In either case, the hearing process set
out in Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 116, is constitutionally mandated for
all parole revocation hearings.
In Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 116, at 489, the Court set out the
minimum requirements of a due process hearing in the parole revocation
situation, as follows:
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The third category of inmate which may be properly
transferred under the Institutional Transfer Statute in-

volves the juvenile convicted as an adult in district court
but sentenced initially to the Industrial Institute."' The
theory relied on in Uram that the sentence is conditioned on
the provisions of the Institutional Transfer Statute will
support the transfer of this class of inmate, as well. 19 In
this case, the conditional facts that determine the appropriate sentence occur after the sentencing rather than being

in existence at the time of the sentence. This power is analogous to probation revocation which is recognized as an
appropriate power for administrative disposition. Once
again, this class of transferees is entitled to a due process
hearing.' There is no problem of notice in this type of case
since the juvenile is subject to the full range of statutory
penalties when he is tried as an adult.
What the statute cannot properly be used for is the
transfer of inmates who were originally sentenced to the
Industrial Institute following a juvenile court proceeding.
In these cases, there is no statutory authorization for commitment at the Penitentiary under the Juvenile Court Act.'

118.
119.
120.

121.

They include (a) written notice of the claimed violation of parole;
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
(unless the hearing officer specifcially finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such
as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation
to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters,
affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), a probation revocation case,
Court
said the right to counsel was dependent on whether the probathe
tioner claims that there is a question of fact at issue concerning the alleged
violation or whether there are complicated mitigating circumstances which
require presentation by an expert. This standard is now used in parole
revocation cases. In view of the juvenile's presumed legal handicap (his
minority legal status) and practical maturity, he should be provided with
counsel as a matter of course in all these hearings.
WYo. STAT. § 7-13-101 (1977).
Uram v. Roach, supra note 14.
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra note 117; Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051
(Wyo. 1981).
WYo. STAT. § 7-13-409 (1977) provides for any probation revocation
hearing to be conducted by an administrative hearing officer. Weisser v.
State, 600 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Wyo. 1979).
Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-229(c), (d) (1978).
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The Juvenile Court sentence cannot be characterized as conditional since there are no circumstances under which the
juvenile court could sentence the juvenile delinquent to the
Penitentiary. When the Board of Charities and Reform
transfers the juvenile delinquent to the Penitentiary, it is
not administering the sentence of the juvenile court; it is
imposing a new sentence. This, unlike Uram, is an improper
delegation of a judicial power to the executive branch. " '
The fact that this is currently done without a due process
hearing highlights the problems with the procedure. But
even given a proper hearing, there is no statutory authorization for the transfer.
A close reading of the legislative history makes it clear
that the legislature only authorized the transfer of a class
of offender who had received a full trial and had been
found guilty of a criminal violation. The 1971 Juvenile
Court Act provides for noncriminal proceedings that may
be held in an informal manner, without notice to the accused
juvenile that the proceedings may indirectly result in imprisonment at an adult penal institution. The use of the
Institutional Transfer Statute to place the juvenile offenders
in the general population of the Penitentiary was never
authorized by the Legislature and is in clear conflict with
the disposition provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1971.
B. Due Process
In deciding In Re Gault, the United States Supreme
Court repeated Justice Frankfurter's famous phrase, "the
history of individual liberty is largely the history of procedure."' 23 This is the key to the attack on the juvenile justice
system in the United States. The juvenile system was conceived at the outset, as being informal, personal, and paternalistic. Juveniles, too, are persons for the purposes of the
constitutional protections of the Bill of Rights and the
122. WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 1 vests the judicial power of the state in "a supreme
court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as the legislature may
.. establish. .. "
123. Supra note 20, at 21 (Quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414
(1945) (separate opinion)).
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Fourteenth Amendment.' 24 Thus, the juvenile, like anyone
else, may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.' Central to the holding in Gault
was the declaration that a juvenile proceeding that resulted
in the confinement of the juvenile involved a protected
liberty interest. The restriction of the juvenile's freedom
could not be wiped away in an arbitrary proceeding simply
because the court's intentions were benevolent.2 6
The amount of process due in any case is dependent on
the nature of the liberty interest and the extent of the restriction.' 7 The Supreme Court deemed the incarceration of
a juvenile in a reform school to be a serious enough infringement of a protected liberty interest to grant the juveniles
right to notice, the right to be represented by counsel,' 28 the
right to a hearing, the right to present, confront, and crossexamine witnesses and the right to be free from self-incrimination.' As extensive as these rights are, the Court did not
mandate a strict adherence to the rules of evidence or formal
trial procedures, nor did it require the right to a jury trial',
or preliminary hearing to determine probable cause."3 These
procedural rights are all part of the guarantees accorded any
adult accused of a crime where there is a possibility of imprisonment for over six months." 2 While the right to a jury
trial and to an appeal on the record were provided statutorily in the Wyoming Juvenile Court Act,' the protections
can be hollow ones.
124. Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The point is not
frequently argued. The most famous United States Supreme Court opinion
dealing with the definition of person under the Constitution is Roe v.
Wade, where it was proclaimed that "'person', as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn." 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). The
clear but unstated assumption is that a child born, even momentarily, is a
person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
125. In re Gault, supra note 20, at 27-28.
126. Id. at 18.
127. Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 116, at 481.
128. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra note 117.
129. In re Gault, supra note 20, at 33, 36, 41, 56, 58.
130. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra note 33.
131. In re Gault, supra note 20, only required the Kent transfer hearing prior
to the adjudicatory hearing. See also Kent v. United States, supra note 8.
In Wyoming, the Kent transfer hearing serves as the only pre-adjudicatory
hearing, if any such hearing is held at all. Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-6-226, -237
(1978).
132. In re Gault, supra note 20, at 29.
133. WYo. STAT. §§ 14-6-223(c), -233 (1978).
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The lack of effective notice inherent in the statutory
transfer provision is at the heart of the due process challenge. Notice is the first of the essential elements comprising
the modern doctrine of due process. Without notice sufficient to apprise the accused of the charges against him and
the consequences involved, a person is unable to intelligently
avail himself of the procedural rights guaranteed him under
the doctrine."3 4
Under the present scheme a juvenile accused of delinquency is given notice of the crime he is charged with, but
he will be unaware of the potential penalty attached to a
determination of delinquency. The court usually does not
inform the juvenile of the potential for transfer since it has
no power to sentence or transfer the juvenile to the Penitentiary. 3 ' A careful reading of the Juvenile Court Act
gives no hint of the transfer process. The common belief is
that a juvenile delinquent cannot be imprisoned."3 '
In the juvenile process this lack of notice can be critical
at a very early stage of the proceedings. Once a delinquency
petition is filed, the accused has only ten days to demand a
jury trial."' The transfer hearing is an optional event. 3 '
Without a preliminary hearing, the juvenile may not be
able to evaluate the seriousness of his predicament and the
need for a jury trial. Most likely, he remains unaware of
the possibility of the proceeding resulting indirectly in a
prison term. If the right to the jury trial is lost by failing
to demand it, the delinquency hearing will be "informal,"
meaning the rules of evidence will not apply in full force. 139
A juvenile convinced he is faced only with the prospect of a
six-month stay at the Industrial Institute or probation might
well choose the informal procedure, since a full-blown trial
134. In the area of juvenile adjudications when both the juvenile's liberty and
his parents' custody rights are at stake, notice must be given to both the
child and the parents. In re Gault, supra note 20, at 31-34.
135. See WYo. STAT. § 14-6-229 (1978).
136. This statement is made after many months of discussions between the
author and citizens of all stripes, including a large number of lawyers
and other professionals who practice outside the field of juvenile corrections.
137. WYo.STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1978).
138. See supra note 131.
139. WYo. STAT. § 14-6-224(a) (1978).
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involves considerable expense and effort. Additionally, a
demand for a jury trial might well antagonize the judge who
has extremely broad discretion in sentencing the juvenile.14
The same juvenile faced with the prospect of prison might
well feel the full trial was a better procedure through which
he may seek to protect his interest. The choice is made more
problematic since it must be made within ten days after
filing the petition, frequently before the juvenile has secured
the advice of counsel. Taken together, the lack of notice,
the possibility of administrative transfer, and the abbreviated time during which the accused may demand a trial
and formal hearing procedures make the statutory protections granting a jury trial and subsequent right to appeal
little more than window dressing for the discredited practices that existed in the juvenile courts before Gault.
A second due process challenge focuses on the transfer
stage rather than the delinquency determination. While the
earlier analysis only applies to those people who are processed through the juvenile courts, this challenge applies
equally to juveniles found delinquent, and juveniles convicted as adults and either sentenced or subsequently transferred to the Industrial Institute. The liberty interest at
issue in the transfer stage can best be understood by analogy
to cases involving parole, probation, and good time release.' 41
These are all statutorily created rights, which are not mandated by the Constitution. A state could choose to allow fixed
sentences for a proper criminal conviction. Once a release
program is legislatively authorized, however, the convicted
person may not be denied due process in the administration
of these programs.'42 Thus, it is unimportant what procedures led to the placement of the juvenile at the Industrial
Institute; the very placement at a reform institution is a
protected liberty interest, a statutorily created right.
The existence of this liberty interest triggers a balancing test which weighs the seriousness of the individual's
potential loss against the State's interest in summary pro140. Id. § 14-6-229.
141. See supranote 117.
142. Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 116, at 480-84.
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ceedings."4 I Generally, the State may not use summary proceedings for its convenience or to save money; rather, an
emergency situation must exist to justify summary proceedings. If immediate action is required to meet an emergency, due process may not be denied except to the extent
necessary to meet the emergency. A hearing may be delayed
in some cases, but it may not be denied permanently. 4 ' In
practice, transfer from the Industrial Institute has to be
approved by the Board of Charities and Reform which meets
There is adequate time between monthly
only monthly.'
meetings to hold a proper hearing. Parens patriae is not a
justification for summary proceedings, and no other serious
governmental interest has been suggested for withholding
a due process hearing from transferees.
The amount of process due at the transfer stage depends on the nature of the liberty interest involved. If the
transferee has received a full trial in district court, the
transfer hearing need not amount to a full trial; but, at the
least, it must include notice, a hearing before a neutral
hearing body, opportunity to be heard and present witnesses,
opportunity to confront witnesses, right to representation
by counsel, and a written explanation of the reasons for
transfer. 6 The juvenile offender who has only had an informal hearing in a juvenile court may not be transferred
to the Penitentiary by an administrative board since he has
not yet been granted his full due process protections at the
initial stage of commitment. It is doubtful that full trial
proceedings can be constitutionally conducted by an administrative board in such a case. '
C. The Equal Protection Problems
Separate from the due process analysis, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
143. Id.
144. The Supreme Court has held that no such state interest exists in the parole
and probation situations. Id.; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra note 117.
145. WYO. STAT. § 9-3-702 (1977).
146. See supra note 117.
147. See WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 1; Uram v. Roach, supra note 14. For the juvenile offender the right to a sentence by a district court judge is an integral part of his due process rights. See Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967). The indeterminate term given at juvenile court proceedings does
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that each person who is imprisoned must receive the same
procedural protections, whether or not they are constitutionally or statutorily required. ' Thus, even if the present
use of the transfer statute was upheld as being legislatively
authorized and as meeting due process requirements, the
statute would be invalid if it resulted in one class of offenders which received fewer procedural protections. The juvenile who is given an informal juvenile court delinquency
hearing which results in his placement at the Industrial
Institute, and who is subsequently transferred by summary
administrative action, has not received the same procedural
protections as one who has been tried and sentenced in a
district court proceeding.'
A second violation of the equal protection clause occurs
because the juvenile offender is denied a fixed sentence
determined by a judge in an appropriate due process setting."' The transferred juvenile keeps the original indeterminate sentence that he received at the juvenile hearing. 5 '
If a juvnile is placed in the Industrial Institute for a status
offense or a delinquent act amounting to a misdemeanor or
a felony carrying a penalty of only a few years,' " ' the juvenile faces a term at the Penitentiary that would exceed the
punishment authorized for a convicted adult. Even if the
delinquent act charged is a serious felony, the juvenile has
not had a proper sentencing before a judicial officer to
determine the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
and the appropriate sentence. 5 ' The indeterminate sentence
is valid only as the quid pro quo for rehabilitative treatment.
Once the juvenile is transferred to the adult penal institution, he has the same right to a judicially determined min54
imum and maximum sentence as does the adult convict.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

not meet the statutory sentencing requirements found in WYo. STAT.
§§ 7-13-201 to -205 (1977). Sentencing is a judicial function under the
Wyoming Constitution. Uram v. Roach, supra note 14.
See Pirsig, supra note 22.
See supra note 109; Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969).
See supra note 147; United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, supra note 60.
See SUpTa notes 12-14.
See supra notes 29 & 38 and accompanying text, for explanation of the
classifications of juvenile offenders.
See supra note 147.
United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, supra note 60, at 1123-24.
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At this point, it may be useful to make a comparison
of the results under the due process analysis and the equal
protection analysis. Due process protections arise because
a significant liberty interest is threatened. The extent of
this threatened loss is the factor that determines what kind
of due process procedures are necessary. The greater the
difference between the liberty interests associated with confinement at the two institutions, the greater the procedural
protections must be. All the procedures required by the due
process analysis are constitutionally mandated. These protections attach to those tried and sentenced in district court
as well as to delinquent juveniles, regardless of the nature
of the proceedings that placed them at the Industrial Institute.
Under the equal protection analysis, the State must
provide substantially the same protections to all. Once it is
determined that the transfer involves a change in the functional conditions of the institutional confinement, then the
person is entitled to the complete range of rights and protections given to others faced with a similar restriction of
liberty. In the case of transfer from the Industrial Institute
to the Penitentiary, a juvenile would be entitled to the
equivalent of a full adult trial. Procedural protections
granted by the Constitution, state laws or even the custom
of the jurisdiction are all required to be provided equally
to all people threatened with the loss of the same liberty
interest. However, a person convicted and sentenced in a
district court proceeding will have received the full range
of trial rights required by the Constitution and by statute.
This trial satisfies the equal protection requirements whether
the convicted person is sentenced directly to the Industrial
Institute or is sentenced to the Penitentiary and is administratively transferred to the Industrial Institute later. For
these transferees, the only challenge that applies is based
on the due process analysis. The hearing required in their
case may be less stringent in its protections. The format for
this type of hearing may be taken from the decisions in the
probation, parole and good time release cases. The Wyoming
Supreme Court has recognized this line of cases and may
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/11
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be expected to follow them closely if called on to set standards for transfer of this class of transferees. 55
CONCLUSION

The three-part analysis of the Institutional Transfer
Statute leaves no doubt that the transfer of juvenile offenders from the Industrial Institute to the State Penitentiary is
statutorily unauthorized and violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6
The various challenges to the validity of the statute affects
every type of potential transferee. The statute does not
authorize the transfer of juveniles judged delinquent or in
need of supervision in spite of claims to the contrary by
current State officials. Even if it did, the statute is invalid
as to these juveniles since it does not provide the procedural
protections required by the Constitution. The State Board
of Charities and Reform has adhered only to the minimum
requirements of the statute and has done nothing to correct
the defects of the statute. Those persons convicted in an
adult trial in district court and placed in the Industrial
Institute are also entitled to an appropriate due process
hearing prior to their transfer. While the hearing need not
reach the formality of a full trial, it must include the essential elements of constitutional due process.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the administration of discipline at the Industrial Institute is the complete
lack of standards at all levels of administration. The stan155. Mason v. State, supra note 120.
156. In Shone v. Maine, supra note 149, a federal district court invalidated a
transfer statute similar to the one in Wyoming using a combination of all
three analyses-legislative, due process, and equal protection. The federal
court rejected the contention that the transfer provision was incorporated
into the sentence of the original court. Similarly, the court rejected the
assertion that transfer was essential to maintain order, and therefore the
power to transfer represented a significant state interest that should give
rise to an implied power to transfer. This interpretation was only available if the state had provided for notice and a hearing followed by state
review of the decision. The court also rejected the claim that confinement
in the State Penitentiary was not for the purposes of punishing the juvenile, but rather it was the only "treatment" available since the other
rehabilitation prgorams had failed. The court affirmed that the two institutions were distinct and that therefore the juveniles had a right to a due
process hearing. The last portion of the opinion confuses the due process
analysis and the equal protection analysis at a point where they almost
seem to merge. The decision reached is similar under either analysis.
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dardless statute is used to justify summary action by the
Board of Charities and Reform. The Board itself has no
procedure for addressing transfer and disciplinary issues
beyond the official approval made by motion, parlimentary
discussion and summary vote. At the Industrial Institute,
there is no formal institutional procedure for determining
when transfer should be sought or discipline administered,
and no code of disciplinary regulation exists to guide the
resident juveniles in their behavior.157 Taken together, this
scheme confronts the juveniles caught in the system with a
formless, arbitrary bureaucracy that can punish without
warning and without heed to their protest. In the present
system there is no particular standard to measure behavior
which will result in punitive transfer or other discipline.
In this setting, the United States Supreme Court's
warning in Gault should be kept in mind: the juvenile
cannot be expected to respect an authority which appears
secretive and arbitrary no matter how well intentioned its
motivation. The delinquent juvenile will be better served by
regular and orderly proceedings where the course of his
rehabilitation is openly and fairly considered."' 8 Finally, the
juvenile, like all people, is entitled to fundamental protections of the Constitution.
DUANE M. KLINE, III

157. See supra note 50.
158. In re Gault, supra note 20, at 26-27.
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